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INTRODUCTION
This issue of the Buffalo Law Review is the first to be
comprised solely by essays. First-and not last, or so it is
hoped-the editors and advisors of the Review intend to
inaugurate an annual tradition of publishing essay collections. This enterprise has certainly begun well; this is a
very fine collection of work. There is good, even important,
writing here, and the editors of the Review have reason to
be proud.
In the staid world of law reviews, publishing an essay
issue is a fairly drastic departure from the norm. While
many journals publish short pieces they call "essays" or
"commentaries," such texts are very rarely essays in any
strong sense of the term. As I will suggest, the essay, as
form and event, represents a much greater break with law
school tradition than one might think-a break not merely
of a stylistic variety, but one profoundly in tension with the
mission and the status of most legal writing, including most
writing published by the Buffalo Law Review. Like virtually
every other law review, the Review usually employs the
orthodox format: in each issue, two or three full length articles, most written by professors and often ponderously
documented, are supplemented by a couple of commentaries
and book reviews, with student notes added as necessary to
complete the volume. Ditching this format, even if only
temporarily, in order to publish an essay issue thus raises
some obvious questions. What was wrong with the orthodox
format? And why publish essays, rather than something
else? What can the Review hope to accomplish?
Obviously, publishing essays is a way for the Review to
draw attention to itself, simply because this enterprise is
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different from what other law journals do. There is no reason to be bashful about this ambition. Publishing, by definition, is about seeking attention. Moreover, inviting wellknown scholars to write essays for the Review may
encourage them to publish here rather than elsewhere (a
proposition stoutly supported by the number of eminent
authors in this issue), thereby raising the profile of the
Review in the legal academy. But acknowledging that the
essay issue is a sort of marketing ploy, like many efforts at
candor, only serves to transpose questions. There are many
ways to get attention, but why take a holiday from the
standard forms of academic expression in the legal academy-the article, comment, and note?1 Why turn toward the
essay rather than another form of expression? And why is
the chance to publish an essay attractive for an established
scholar?
Addressing these questions requires more attention to
what the Review may hope to receive when it solicits
essays. The word "essay" has intertwined meanings; let me
tease out three. Perhaps the most common meaning of
"essay" is simply an opinion piece,
in which the author sets
forth a judgment on, or a stance towards, a given matter.
While essays may marshal facts, may invoke authority (the
Constitution, perhaps), and may exhibit fine logic, such
texts ultimately work through the reader's trust in the
author's voice. The reader's trust in the author-and hence
the success of the essay-is often established by the
author's experience or prestige, who the author is, rather
than what is written. Successful essays sound right, "ring
true"-the judgment offered in the text accords with the
reader's. In this understanding, while essays tend to be
normative, even argumentative, and are often written in a
personal style, the form works by reassurance, preaching to
the converted. It is in this sense that we speak of the
"essays" of political pundits.
But there are other ways to think about the essay, in
some tension with the idea of a writing expressing personal
opinion tending towards daily affirmation. The English
word essay comes from the Old French, essai, a trying or
venturing, and in that sense a trial, and is indissolubly
1. I have addressed some of these questions in a different context, and at
greater length, in David A. Westbrook, Pierre Schlag and the Temple of
Boredom, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 649 (2003).
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associated with Montaigne's Essays. Montaigne claimed to
be attempting-trying-to describe himself through the
detailed articulation of his concerns. Montaigne's texts, and
indeed all essays, ask, "How do I think?" In this understanding, the person of the author not only underwrites the
power of the text, as in the essay considered as an expression of opinion, but the author is also a subject of the text's
critique.
"How do I think?" strangely turns out to be an objective
question. Musil wrote that "[nlothing is more foreign to [the
essay] than the irresponsible and half-baked quality of
thought known as subjectivism."2 Because many of his
concerns were fundamental, and because he did such a fine
job expressing them, Montaigne ended up producing much
more than a collection of personal opinions, even much
more than a self-portrait. In writing about his rather particular situation-as a sixteenth century French nobleMontaigne manages to write about Everyman. Taken as a
whole, the Essays constitute a word mosaic of the human
condition.
Therein lies a problem: Montaigne's Essays were written and revised over twenty years, polished until they
became masterpieces. Such art is rarely if ever achieved
without a great deal of work, but in doing such work,
Montaigne is not trying to think, he is trying to write. At
some point the Essays cease to be about Montaigne, and
begin to be about the Essays themselves. Good writing
asserts itself, a phenomenon widely attested to by writers
who have the sensation that the writing comes from someplace outside, that they are not writing at all. To compound
matters, part of the charm of Montaigne and many other
admired essayists (perhaps Joseph Epstein in our day) is
that their writing looks effortless. Thus, effort, particularly
in the hands of good writers, is first redirected from the
ostensible subject of the essay onto the text, and then
denied altogether. In this way the essay, a display of effort,
tends to be transformed into a writerly tour de force, a display of skill, which is in some way the opposite (if also the
refinement) of the essayist's intention.
Which brings me to a third meaning of essay: a prose
text devoted to the occasion of its own writing, that is, a
2. DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM
IN A TIME OF MISCONTENT x (2004).
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text which struggles against its status as a writing. More
simply, the essay may be understood as the effort to write a
thought truly. This is not as easy as it sounds; it is indeed
both impossible and antagonistic to the first two understandings of what writing an essay means. Under the
pressure of hard thought, opinions about things-the core of
our first understanding of essay-tend to grow complex,
contradictory, and worst of all, insufficient. In the same
vein, if we are really critical about our language, we realize
that the words we have used to express our thoughts have
failed to do so adequately, and worse, have imported their
own distractions from what we (think we) are trying to say.
Representation fails. The first two understandings of
essay-as articulation of opinion, and the description of
thought-are not wrong, but are preliminary to this third
understanding, in which the failure of both opinion and
language are conditions for the real work that essays do.
To ask for texts that are uncertain of what they wish to
express, skeptical of their powers of representation, and
that ultimately struggle to deny their status as textsmuch less their status as authoritative texts, is a most unlaw school, un-law review, thing to do. In fact, soliciting
such texts ought to be prohibited, and if not, the results
ought to be widely ignored, and therefore I presume that
our school's administration will shut down this enterprise
immediately. But to be less flippant, this enterprise cuts
against the professional grain. The law, and especially the
legal professoriate, discourages doubt in favor of advocacy,
places great faith in the representational
power
("precision") of its language, and most importantly of all,
strives to create texts that are authoritative.
Yet this is a time of widespread if not always explicitly
acknowledged doubt. The categories that we use to understand our world are commonly viewed as inapposite, but
efforts-to establish new categories tend to be viewed with a
degree of hostility. Indeed, perhaps the most famous definition of postmodernism-Lyotard's "suspicion of metanarratives"-bespeaks just this consciousness of lacking an
adequate vocabulary with which to think and so construct
our world, coupled with a belief that, as an intellectual
matter, we should resist the imposition of new categories.3
3. See JEAN-FRANCoIs LYOTARD, THE POST-MODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (1979).
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When words like war, democracy, the state, and yes, law,
lose their coherence, then times may be good for thinkers,
but can hardly be called comfortable, and we should be
careful of writing that seems too sure of itself.
But while high modern faith may not seem accessible,
and at least when speaking we may all seem postmodern
now, it is quite difficult to be postmodern, and strangely
difficult in the university. An anecdote: I recently wrote a
short piece setting forth an idea of mine, without citation or
much elaboration, mostly to get the thought down before I
lost it. The text was passed around a bit, and ended up
being submitted for publication, and hence peer review. The
reviewers, no doubt sensible academics, wanted to see discussion of various classic texts, but especially of contemporary scholarship that they deemed pertinent-my reviewers
needed a discussion of other texts, a metanarrative. Without such a metanarrative, my text was incomplete, indeed
unacceptable. Without relation to the literature, how could
one be sure of a text's, or an author's, discipline? And without a discipline, how could an academic text have authority,
demand to be read?
I am not being naive. I know that most writing is
performative. Professional writing is done for professional
reasons; the text is essentially about the status of the
author. Considered in the old fashioned terms of representing an idea, stating something truly, however, the
desire for prestige, or even the effort to look respectable,
exerts a baleful influence, at the very least a distraction, on
the writing. This unavoidable difficulty posed by the ambitions of the writer (recall Samuel Johnson's "No man but a
blockhead ever wrote, except for money") is greatly worsened, however, when the writer does not believe in the conventions she is struggling to fulfill, doubts what he is trying
to become.4 The combination of doubt in our categories, and
the need to write within the categories, breeds bad writing
in the academy, and specifically the law school. (I hope this
does not come as a shock.)
It would be too strong to call such writing dishonest, or
even in bad faith. Bad faith may well be better than no
faith at all. Almost all of being a student, and much of being
a professor, is conformity, and it would be foolishly roman4. JAMES
Press 1965).

BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON
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tic to think that an altogether bad thing. There is nothing
evil in pretending to read everybody, and dropping footnotes accordingly. Too, there is much to be said for disciplines, some more than others. However, while conformity,
repetition, habit and the like have merits, they are hardly
intellectual virtues, and may be antagonistic to intellectual
life. Especially in a time of doubt, the need to conform may
inhibit the expression, or even the formation, of thought.
Assuming that this is a fair description of the conditions of
contemporary intellectual production in the law school, can
it be surprising that so much writing for law reviews tends
to be awkward, forced, unreal (and deservedly little read)?
And if this diagnosis is correct, then the intellectual project
embodied by the orthodox law review frays, if perhaps does
not unravel altogether. It is silly to talk about being precise
when one is not even being candid. And how is one to take
such texts seriously, to believe they are vested with any
intrinsic authority, that is, authority beyond the merely
bureaucratic?
By committing to publishing essays, the Buffalo Law
Review is creating an opportunity for something refreshingly new and intellectually exciting. The Review invited
professors with formidable intellectual reputations-almost
all tenured, who ought to feel themselves somewhat at
ease-to write essays on topics of their choosing. Although
the Review made no substantive requests, authors were
asked to contribute thoughts on a matter that they were
currently exploring, to confront questions for which they
might not have answers, to take risks. Nor were there any
formal rules, beyond a page guideline, but the authors were
encouraged to write with aesthetic discipline, searching
candor, and a delight in the ambiguity of one's own questions. These authors, in short, have been invited to show us
their thinking, which is a difficult and even brave thing to
do. We hope that they are flattered to be invited to think in
public; we are honored that they have made the effort.
David A. Westbrookt

t Professor of Law, Buffalo Law School, State University of New York. My
thanks to Pierre Schlag for his comments, and especially to Jack Schlegel for
the kitchen table where much of this idea was hatched.

